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the (perhaps minor) initiating casualty
under control. For those who delight in
finding small technical mistakes, there
are a few, if one looks closely enough—
for example, the Scorpion’s fire control
system was not a Mark 113 but a vintage Mark 101. But none detracts from
the overall high quality of the investigative effort.
Even without a specific “cause célèbre”
event to dissect and review for “lessons
learned,” Silent Steel provides much to
think about for anyone interested in or
involved with combating casualties at sea.
There is even some consolation, however small in comparison to the loss of
life, in the knowledge that the United
States has come to realize to a significant degree in the years since that “material readiness is a consumable”; we are
reluctant to run ships (and people) as
hard as we did in the early to mid-1960s.
When I rode Scorpion, it averaged more
than three hundred days a year at sea.
Today, even with dwindling platform
resources, the Submarine Force has begun to say no to many of the increasing
operational requirements from senior
regional and national commanders.
JAMES H. PATTON, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Keefer, Edward C., ed. Foreign Relations of the
U.S.: Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, vol. 6.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2006. 1,173pp. $65

This State Department volume, the first
of five that will cover the end period of
the Vietnam War, documents major
foreign policy issues of the Nixon administration, with a focus on U.S. policy toward Vietnam, Cambodia, and to

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2007.vp
Wednesday, February 28, 2007 8:14:53 AM

BOOK REVIEWS

155

a lesser extent Laos during the period of
January 1969 to July 1970. What a time
it was!
In the 1968 presidential campaign, candidate Richard M. Nixon stated that he
had a plan to end the war in Vietnam.
As it turned out, the “plan” was embryonic. When he took office he moved
slowly, convinced that how the United
States ended the war would have an enduring impact on future American foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s
national security adviser, became the
key figure in the effort to end the war, a
program that became known as
“Vietnamization.”
Vietnamization was directed toward the
upgrading of South Vietnamese forces,
which was to be accompanied by
phased withdrawals of U.S. forces.
Completion would depend on how
things went in Vietnam. This work, in
addition to documenting policy efforts
to move this program along, also documents efforts to convince Hanoi that it
was dealing with a strong adversary: for
example, secret U.S. bombing of Cambodia, integration of the secret war in
Laos with the conflict in Vietnam, and
covert operations against North
Vietnam.
One of the principal themes developed
here is the search for a negotiated settlement, first in the Paris Peace Talks and
then through secret meetings between
Kissinger and North Vietnamese foreign
minister Xuan Thuy and special adviser
Le Duc Tho. Here, and throughout the
book, Kissinger’s memorandums to
Nixon are the key documents. Many appear in Kissinger’s memoirs; however, in
this work they are more complete.
In March 1970, Cambodia’s Norodom
Sihanouk was overthrown by the Lon
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Nol government. For years enemy
sanctuaries and supply caches on the
border area of that country had been a
problem for Americans and South Vietnamese. Now there was a government
in Phnom Penh that would permit
something to be done about it. By April,
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
forces were mounting operations in the
former sanctuaries.
Soon the notion of American forces
participating in cross-border operations
was considered. The last third of this
book is dedicated to the Cambodian incursion, and here Keefer’s editorial
notes and footnotes are particularly
valuable. Some touch upon the U.S. domestic situation that developed in that
unforgettable spring of 1970: “On May
4, 1970 at approximately 4:45 p.m., the
President told Kissinger, ‘At Kent State
there were 4 or 5 killed today. But that
place has been bad for quite some
time.’” The footnote goes on to develop
related conversations through May 7.
This volume is an essential source for
anyone researching the period, in particular American foreign and military
policy toward Southeast Asia. Edward
Keefer has done an outstanding job in
bringing together and giving focus to
this vital aspect of American foreign
policy during the early Nixon
administration.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Professor Emeritus, University of Vermont
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“It is the nature of great events to obscure the great events that came before
them.” This memorable phrasing begins
nineteenth-century historian Francis
Parkman’s masterwork on the French
and Indian War, Montcalm and Wolfe.
One hundred twenty years later, Fred
Anderson’s The War That Made America clears away with lucid prose and effective narrative style the obscurity that
has veiled the French and Indian War.
Described as the “first world war” by
Winston Churchill, it was the fourth in
a series of six wars fought between England and France and their various allies
between 1689 and 1815. It enflamed
French Canada and British North
America from the Carolinas to Nova
Scotia, and it spread to Europe, the Caribbean, West Africa, India, and eventually to the Philippines. Despite this
nearly worldwide conflagration and the
approximately 800,000 total military
casualties that occurred in all theaters,
this conflict (also commonly known as
the Seven Years’ War) is no more familiar to most Americans than the
Peloponnesian War, according to
Anderson. His highly readable and concise history, primarily focused on the
fierce struggle from 1754 to 1760 between the British, the French, and numerous American Indian nations for
control of North America, elegantly
remedies this lack of familiarity.
Anderson, a history professor at the
University of Colorado and a former
Army infantry officer, is the author of
Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War
and the Fate of Empire in British North
America, 1754–1766, winner of the
Francis Parkman and Mark Lynton history prizes in 2001. The War That Made
America is a scaled-down telling of that
prize-winning epic; it is also a
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